

Hispanics in Arizona: The History Continues

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As Arizona celebrates its centennial anniversary, a glance at the congressional debates that resulted, not in its admission as the 48th state in 1912, but in its rejection in 1903, reveals relevant themes regarding the Mexican experience in the state. In 1902, the Committee on Territories was considering petitions for statehood from Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, and it decided to send a few its members to the Southwest to confirm what they already believed: that neither Arizona nor New Mexico met their criteria. They deemed Oklahoma ready, but it would have to reapply under a separate bill. The senators visited New Mexico in early November and conducted interviews with local officials and businessmen. They sought information on tax revenues, economic output, and weather and irrigation conditions. Far more frequently, however, they inquired about the size and characteristics of the Mexican population. An interviewing pattern soon emerged: How many Mexicans live here? Do they speak English? Do school children regress to speaking Spanish when they leave the classroom? Do they need interpreters in court? How many cases involving Mexicans are criminal in nature? Do Mexicans pay taxes? Their bias against Mexicans was such, that when some local officials informed them that Mexicans did meet their civic obligations, the committee simply concentrated on language use or population size. By the time they reached Arizona, their initial partiality had only increased. They first visited Prescott and Phoenix and found them highly representative of the American character they sought. Content with the relatively small size of the Mexican population, the interviewers instead asked about agriculture, mining, and ranching. As they moved south, however, the New Mexico pattern re-emerged. In Tucson they asked the census enumerators

about the size of the Mexican population and if they needed interpreters, but they did not bring up race or language when talking to the president of the University of Arizona, the superintendent of schools, and the president of a local bank. Tucson, of course, had high levels of English proficiency among Mexican school children and a vibrant, if small, Mexican middle class. In Bisbee, the committee focused on the existence of so-called Mexican and American mining towns.¹

Their objective, in other words, did not change throughout the trip, and they returned to Washington with a confirmation of their assumption: they found Arizona and New Mexico guilty of being too Mexican for statehood—too Mexican, *not Spanish*, as the governor of New Mexico had suggested. That is, Senator John Kean (R-NJ) retorted during congressional hearings that such a high concentration of Mexicans in Arizona and New Mexico did not in any way resemble the Dutch population of lower New York or the Germans of eastern Pennsylvania. Kean explained that Mexicans descended from Indians and Spaniards but inherited only the language and the laziness from the latter. Mexicans, he further posited, survived in those rough climates because of their complacency—even goats will seek more food, he maintained. Senator Henry E. Burnham (R-NH) added that “the Mexican race has remained distinct” and that Americans have solely accounted for the recent “moral, material and political advancement” in the territories. Senator Chauncey Depew (R-NY) concluded that since Mexicans had retained their language, traditions, and way of life over two generations under the American flag, the territories would not be ready for statehood until more white Americans arrived.²

The 1902 visit by the congressional delegation and the prior and subsequent debates on the suitability of Arizona for statehood underscored important themes that have frequently appeared in the history of Mexicans in the state: race, immigration, culture, language,

assimilation, crime, and so on, and the interconnection of these issues with education, economic opportunities, and civil rights—to name a few areas of contestation. Just as revealing as the questions and arguments members of the delegation made, are the topics they left unexplored: Are Mexicans white? Will their educational attainment improve under the right conditions? Are Mexicans hard workers? Do they work for low wages? The committee most likely assumed that these matters were self-evident. Mexicans were legally white, but socially, economically, and, hence, politically, they lacked the attributes and thus the benefits of whiteness. Their primary value lay, not in the educational or political realm, but in their service as cheap labor. American entrepreneurs, whose capital and political connections led to the development of the southwestern economy, clearly understood that the increasing presence of Mexicans helped to maintain wages low and did not much care about cultural or linguistic proclivities. Politicians in Washington, furthermore, condoned the uses and abuses of Mexican labor, but they did not find them deserving of the rights of citizenship and self-government. Not surprisingly, some of the same senators who opposed statehood for Arizona and New Mexico rallied against independence for the Philippines. In both cases, they insisted that whites had to govern and guide their fellow non-white inhabitants.³

In spite of the denigration of the Mexican population during these congressional debates, imperialist politicians still acknowledged the possibility of Americanization and thus the opportunity of Arizona to gain statehood. Indeed, in rejecting the 1902 bill, the Committee on Territories explained that once more white Americans migrated into the region and helped Mexicans to acquire American customs and the English language, the population would become sufficiently American to re-apply. As culturally insensitive as this proposition appears, it still fit within an assimilationist framework. Mexicans in New Mexico and Arizona had undertaken a

pluralist approach by distancing themselves from Indian, blacks, and Asians and by suggesting that they were just another Euro-American group—like the Dutch or the French—but the committee had summarily dismissed their argument by citing the inferiority of their Indian *and* Spanish ancestries. In fact, the assimilation of Mexicans remained a viable option as late as the 1920s, when marginalization and exclusion became the two leading policies at the federal and local levels.⁴

The original chapter on Hispanics in Arizona, written for the seventy-fifth anniversary of statehood, posed a series of questions regarding the need for future research. In 1987, there were but a few scholars engaged in the history of Hispanics in the United States, and they mostly studied California and Texas—whose universities continue to outnumber and thus outspend their Arizona counterparts. Therefore, the lives of Hispanics—or more appropriately, Mexicans, in the case of Arizona (see Figure 1)—had received relatively scant attention, and more scholars needed to delve—closer or for the first time—into local histories, the history of labor (particularly mining and agriculture), immigration, and political activism. In the following pages, we look at how researchers have answered some of these questions and how they have also explored other areas, such as education, gender, and displacement. We then examine demographic data to evaluate past, current, and future patterns of the continuing Hispanic experience in Arizona and the United States. In the conclusion, we look at areas for possible future research.

The study of whiteness has increased our understanding of race relations in the United States, and local histories clearly illustrate that Mexicans in Arizona certainly did not enjoy all the privileges of their legal classification as white. Like the original chapter notes, here, too, like in California and Texas, Mexicans were victims of lynchings and mob violence; a sheriff could




Figure 1. The 1930 questionnaire marked the first and only time the forms included Mexican as a racial classification. In 2000, the forms allowed people to choose among several ethnic/racial classifications and to write in an ancestry. Figure 1a illustrates that Arizona had the highest rate of Mexican population in 1930. Figure 1b reveals that in 2000, Hispanics in Arizona claimed Mexican ancestry at rates higher than any other state. The 2000 data signify that that the state had fewer Hispanics of other ancestries and/or that Hispanics in Arizona were more likely to recognize their Mexican heritage. In either case, Arizona was and continues to be the most Mexican state in the country.

manipulate state tax laws to strip them of their property; they participated on juries at lower rates than whites; they were subject to more prosecutions, longer sentences, and a disproportionate number of death sentences; hospitals often denied them services; some employers—notably, mining companies—used dual-wage systems where Mexicans received lower salaries for equal work and had no access to higher-paying positions; company mining towns relegated them to segregated, deplorable housing; and placer miners called their towns “white men’s camps” and passed resolutions to deny access to “Asiatics and Sonorians.” On the eve of statehood, nativist organizations and labor unions—many of which excluded Mexicans—endorsed propositions to ban aliens from public projects and from hazardous occupations (namely mines), to require all employers to maintain their foreign workforce at a maximum of twenty percent, and to administer literacy tests to potential voters.⁵ Mexicans were the primary targets of these political maneuvers since the Chinese population had declined significantly.

White families in the Clifton-Morenci mining town definitely did not believe Mexicans were white. In 1904, the New York Foundling Hospital attempted to place Catholic orphans—mostly Irish, but also Italian and Polish—with Mexican families in the Arizona mining town. Hospital officials made their racially blind decision on a Catholic/non-Catholic binary, thus

choosing Mexican families over the auspices of the Protestant Children's Aid Society of New York. The white families of Clifton-Morenci, particularly the women, appalled at the placement of white children with Mexican families, protested, then kidnapped the children, and eventually succeeded in adopting them. They believed—unlike the Irish leaders of the hospital, the French priest of the local church, and the Irish-Catholic nuns who brought the children—that whiteness and its privileges did not belong with Mexicans. In effect, they relied on the acquiescence of the white community, the legal system, local newspapers, and eventually, even the Catholic Church, to reestablish the racial hierarchy of the town. Conversely, Italians could acquire the benefits of whiteness by demonstrating their allegiance to whites. Italians in Clifton-Morenci sometimes earned so-called Mexican wages and, at best, ranked between Mexicans and whites in the salary scale. Some Italians, however, took advantage of opportunities to ascend the racial hierarchy. First, in 1903, they abandoned a strike after management threatened to classify them as Mexican for the purposes of job assignments and wages. Second, in 1904, an Italian man became the leader of the vigilantes who removed the white orphans from the Mexican families, calling Mexicans half-breeds and degenerates. He eventually adopted one of the children. By then, the white community did not question his whiteness—though, it definitely did not consider Mexicans to be white.⁶

The *de facto* classification of Mexicans as non-white also had repercussions regarding wages and working conditions for the men, and social and welfare benefits for both men and women. We now know that while some mining towns, like Bisbee and Clifton-Morenci, developed a white/Mexican binary early on, other towns, such as Benson and Tombstone, abandoned their once welcoming and accommodating hospitality only gradually but highly resembled Bisbee by the 1930s due primarily to the economic and political influence mining

companies exerted over the entire area. Local race relations throughout Cochise County thus closely mirrored the exclusionary patterns that large mining interests had established on the jobsite and in the towns they virtually owned. Not surprisingly, during the Great Depression, as federal funds moved through local organizations for distribution, political and mining officials deferred to local white middle-class women, and the latter promptly adopted an allocating structure similar to the dual-wage system that prevailed in the mines: Mexican families purportedly needed less money because they had fewer needs. Thus, three forces united to implement race divisions in towns where binaries had long existed, to rigidify them where they had recently appeared, and to create them where they did not yet exist: the federal government (by directly yet irresponsibly infusing money into the state); local officials (by ensuring that their organizations of choice administered benefits); and white women (by replicating the racial hierarchies so familiar to mining towns).⁷ Mexicans in the mining town of Miami, Arizona experienced a similar type of discrimination. During the first half of the twentieth century, they had to attend segregated churches, theaters, YMCAs, and schools, and they also had to work under dual-wage systems at the local mines. They assuaged their situation by forming fraternal organizations and demanding better working conditions, but their efforts achieved little success. Furthermore, racial animosity during the Great Depression resulted in higher unemployment than that experienced by white workers, in lower or non-existent welfare benefits, and in the forced or voluntary repatriation of approximately one thousand Mexicans and Mexican Americans.⁸

Mexicans in Phoenix have historically encountered problems similar to those faced by residents of Tucson and the mining towns. While we still await a project equivalent to Thomas Sheridan's *Los Tucsonenses*, we now have a better understanding of the Mexican experience in the state's capital. Unlike Tucson and other southern communities, Phoenix was founded as an

American city with no Mexican past. Mexicans, nonetheless, contributed greatly to the early development of the town, particularly during its early agricultural phase and in fact accounted for approximately half of the population until the late 19th century. Whites, however, immigrated in large numbers and they soon dominated the city's economic, political, and cultural realms. By 1913, they had replaced ward elections in favor of an at-large system that clearly favored the majority and rendered Mexicans politically insignificant, particularly since one year earlier the state constitution had made suffrage contingent upon passing a literacy test. Mexicans in Phoenix rarely gained political office until the 1970s. As early as the 1890s, housing covenants and rising real estate prices led to a *barrioization* similar to that of other Arizona and southwestern towns. Negligent enforcement of building and health codes produced terrible sanitary conditions in these enclaves, and residents encountered segregation when they visited other areas. Notably, a Spanish-speaking, white priest met worshipers at the front steps of St. Mary's church by directing Mexicans to the lower church area: "Mexicanos abajo," he tellingly said. During the first seven decades of the twentieth century, Mexicans represented a significant portion of the population—consistently accounting for approximately one of every seven residents—but they primarily occupied low-paying positions and lived in isolated areas.⁹

Historical accounts from other relatively small communities underscore stories of success that buttress the position that throughout the history of Arizona some spaces have offered favorable conditions where Mexicans have been able to thrive. In early Yuma, for example, José María Redondo (1830-1878) took advantage of his middle-class upbringing in Mexico and succeeded in mining, business, and politics in Arizona. His white complexion undoubtedly allowed him to establish business connections and to gain acceptance among white residents. Nonetheless, similarly positioned—and complexioned—individuals more frequently than not,

experienced downward mobility in the Southwest of the late nineteenth century.¹⁰ Conditions were also favorable for Mexican entrepreneurs in early Tucson. In 1896, Carlos Jácome and Loreto Carrillo opened a department store that would thrive for over eighty years, serving both as a symbol of increasing American consumerism and underscoring the importance of forging business connections with exporters in Latin America and Spain. The Jácome family demonstrated that their command of the Spanish language and familiarity with Hispanic culture offered commercial advantages. Their story serves as an example of the countless other business enterprises that have historically catered to the Mexican community or have relied on Mexican suppliers for their products.¹¹ Mexicans in Jerome also found relatively auspicious conditions at the turn of the twentieth century. This mining area—far from welcoming all ethnic groups since it explicitly and violently targeted Chinese workers—offered a mostly peaceful environment for Mexicans. The better treatment Mexican workers experienced came in large part because, unlike other mining towns, mining operations in Jerome were not under the control of large corporations. Thus, there was no dual-wage or job-specific discrimination, and workers from all ethnic backgrounds—the experience of the Chinese notwithstanding—received shorter workdays and better wages. Furthermore, mining administrators allowed local business owners to run the political scene. The size of the Mexican population was small, but those who remained in Jerome during the early decades of the twentieth century experienced consistent upward mobility.¹²

Favorable working conditions in the mines—particularly for Mexican workers—were nonetheless extremely rare. While scholars disagree on whether management created or simply exploited the racial ideologies of its white workers to create internal labor divisions, all evidence points to consistent abuses, discrimination, and outright exclusion or exploitation of non-white workers. The discriminatory practices of individual white miners and the creation of so-called

“white men’s camps” yielded by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the overbearing and coercive presence of large capitalist enterprises. The cosmopolitan composition of the labor force—Mexicans, native whites, Chinese, and southern and eastern European immigrants—made it difficult for workers to overcome their differences in language, culture, and racial and political ideologies. Job specialization, technological advances, and the increasing importance of the mining engineer created further distinctions between those jobs and the tasks Mexican workers performed. Management, therefore, found it easier to grant higher wages and benefits first to native, and later to foreign, white workers in exchange for their allegiance during labor unrest. Mexican workers thus lacked the necessary coercive power to organize effective strikes, and when they went on strikes on their own or when they convinced white workers to accompany them, the federal government readily intervened on behalf of management. Naturally, the racial divide that pervaded on the jobsite easily translated into unequal social relations, segregation, and political and economic disparities.¹³

The interventionist presence of the federal government looms even larger in the area of agriculture. While the ideal of the yeoman farmer survived in Arizona well into the twentieth century, the opening of the Roosevelt Dam in 1910 signaled the beginning of the broad and consistent support that Washington would grant to Arizona farmers and ranchers. The state’s farmland, particularly that designated for citrus and cotton, was thus well on its way to becoming a labor-intensive, large-capital enterprise that would rely heavily on a constant pool of Mexican agricultural workers. Growing demand for workers led to increases in immigration, and there, too, the federal government acquiesced to local agribusiness interests and exempted Mexicans from the restrictive policies that brought European immigration to a halt in the late 1910s-early 1920s. Nonetheless, federal policies on Mexican immigration have been at once inclusionary and

exclusionary. Washington politicians, in consultation with local capitalists and interest groups, have both granted legal entry and condoned clandestine crossings and used federal power to limit the rights of immigrants and to deport them when deemed undesirable. Such policy approaches largely explain the welcoming accommodations of the *bracero* programs of the 1910s and the 1940s-1960s and the forced deportations during the 1930s and 1950s. The arrival of Mexican workers under the manifest understanding that they will perform menial work has facilitated the denial of basic social, economic, and constitutional rights. Immigration debates and policies and political scapegoating have thus perpetuated the image of the temporary, unassimilable Mexican worker. Furthermore, in spite of the historical fact that since the incorporation of the Southwest, Americans of Mexican descent have virtually always outnumber Mexican immigrants, both groups have suffered the negative repercussions of being labeled as temporary or itinerant, unassimilable, and culturally and intellectually inferior. After all, denying rights to an entire group that resides in the United States temporarily seems much more palatable, and, similarly, admitting temporary menial workers—as opposed to granting permanent residence to workers who already occupy those jobs—serves to placate conservative concerns over cultural pluralism.¹⁴

The experiences of Mexican school children paralleled the larger social, economic, and labor trends in the state. Geographic segregation and high levels of poverty created a situation where educational attainment seemed unreachable for most people. A clear picture has started to emerge, and it both confirms and contradicts such a perception. Middle-class Mexicans entered careers in education since the late nineteenth century, negotiating between races, languages, and cultures, and returning to their communities to teach future generations. Mexican children benefited greatly from the funding of public education since 1871, though they were more likely

to attend school in an established community—like Tucson—than in places where they represented an itinerant or small community—like the mining towns or Phoenix. Language acquisition became the primary objective. At first, the teaching of English fit within the pluralist approach, where Mexicans sought to maintain their culture. By the early 1900s, however, assimilationist administrators began an effort to teach language and culture to replace the mother tongue and culture of Mexican students. By the 1920s, when marginalization and exclusion started to shape immigration policies, schools became targets of segregationist campaigns. These policies simply completed the geographic barrioization that had already pervaded in places like Tucson, Phoenix, and almost all mining towns. Segregation occurred in two major forms: administrators separated students into American and Mexican schools, and, where schools were integrated, principals created Mexican classrooms, purportedly to remedy linguistic and academic deficiencies. The state relegated virtually all decision-making to local administrators, and they openly questioned whether Mexican children should even have access to an education. Undoubtedly, the prevailing stereotypical image of Mexicans as temporary residents and menial workers largely influenced the perception that their children did not in fact need a formal education for the types of jobs they would eventually perform. This widespread mentality might have indeed become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not surprisingly, Mexican schools and classrooms received less funding and attention. In general, Mexican students—regardless of their birthplace and intellectual capacity—had to follow educational tracks that contained extra levels and emphasized vocational and homemaking curricula. Such obstacles, in addition to the physical and psychological abuse they received, translated into high drop-out rates and a widespread inferiority complex in their race, culture, and language.¹⁵

Regardless of its origin, segregation generated a proliferation of barrios where Mexicans formed relations that lasted over several generations. These enclaves offered residents a sense of the familiar, of a common culture and language, and of similar experiences. They formed bonds and networks that prepared both newcomers and longtime residents for life in the United States. These barrios, however, often became targets of private, civic, and government projects that forced the displacement of residents. In the 1960s, for example, real estate, tourism, and development interest groups in Tucson coveted the historical Barrio Libre community due to its proximity to the downtown area. The proposed convention center would draw attention to the modern Tucson while eliminating the old neighborhood, not just from the city's future, but also from its past. City leaders neglected the barrio for decades, allowing violations of housing codes that eventually made it a prime target of urban renewal. The project led to the displacement of approximately one thousand residents and disrupted the community ties and the sense of place and belonging they had developed since the nineteenth century. Grassroots activists offered some resistance, but their efforts failed to convince city leaders, who, nonetheless, yielded to pressure from the Tucson Heritage Foundation to preserve the Fremont House while destroying Mexican American landmarks. Such a move signified a final insult to the Mexican community, since the city in essence rewrote Tucson's history, lending credence to the pioneer narrative that underscored the contributions of whites while erasing the places and spaces of the city's Mexican past.¹⁶

The predominantly Mexican community of Golden Gate in Phoenix met a similar fate in the 1970s and 1980s when local investors and boosters, in conjunction with federal officials, sought the expansion of Sky Harbor International Airport. Residents of the barrio, which had formed in an area of little interest to city officials or business interests—and indeed not a part of

Phoenix proper until 1959—had built a community where they found social, cultural, and religious comfort. The city, however, cooperated with business interests and claimed eminent domain over Golden Gate, assuring residents that their departure actually presented them with an opportunity to improve their lives. Residents encountered further aggravation when officials threatened to engage in lengthy litigation if they did not accept the low prices the city offered for their homes.¹⁷

Mexicans in Arizona, like their counterparts in other parts of the Southwest, have consistently offered various forms of resistance. Groups in several towns formed fraternal associations, founded newspapers, and strengthened their bonds around cultural and patriotic celebrations. As early as the 1910s and 1920s they mounted successful legal challenges to segregationist practices, but the rise of a large middle class in the 1930s signaled the birth a stalwart activist core that—having witnessed the repatriation of a large segment of their population—perceived more than ever that their future lay in the United States and that they had to fight to protect their rights. World War II and the economic benefits it brought in the form of employment and the GI Bill further increased and buttressed Mexican American organizations and associations. The high rates of military service gave Mexican Americans a new sense of purpose, belonging, and entitlement that they demonstrated with their leadership. Nonetheless, the culmination of political activism took place during the era of the civil and equal rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, as Mexicans, like other groups in the United States, expressed their discontent more vociferously than ever.¹⁸

The political activism of Mexican Americans coincided with the larger Chicano movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, while focusing more on educational disparities and injustices and relatively less on the plight of agricultural workers and the mounting casualties of

the Vietnam War. National leaders—such as César Chávez, José Angel Gutiérrez, Reies López Tijerina, and Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales—all promoted their causes in the state, but Arizona activists concentrated their efforts on local issues. The 1960s thus catalyzed an enduring effort to combat historical discrimination against Mexicans in Arizona, particularly in the form of unfair labor practices and *de facto* housing and school segregation. Activists understood that the deplorable conditions of their communities derived from decades of economic, racial, and social discrimination, and they sought to improve the lives of their people, in part, by targeting an integral link in the trans-generational cycle of poverty: the failure of the educational system. They focused their attention on specific problems: poor educational achievement; prevalent maltreatment of students at the primary and secondary levels; the practice of placing high school students in vocational rather than academic tracks or placing them in classes for the mentally-disabled; the relatively miniscule enrollment of Mexican Americans at the college level; the absence of class content on their history; and—directly related to all these problems—the inadequate representation of Mexican Americans in the faculties and administrations throughout all levels of the educational system. Mexican Americans achieved relative success during the 1970s, but, more importantly, they paved the way for the improvements they would create over the next three decades. Activists organized community groups, and students formed organizations at the high school and college levels. Their marches, political pressure, and class walk-outs, all evinced that political awareness had indeed transformed into political action. Conditions at the turn of the millennium, while far from ideal, represent considerable progress. Hispanic candidates have gained public office at unprecedented levels, especially in local elections. School districts with high concentrations of Hispanic students are more likely than ever to have Hispanic teachers, counselors, and administrators, and the public colleges and

universities have significantly increased the number of students and faculty members—though proportions that match the size of the state’s Hispanic population still seem remote as the centennial anniversary approaches. Similarly, programs, coursework, and integrated content relevant to the Hispanic experience have all increased since the 1970s, but these endeavors face constant scrutiny from conservative faculties and administrators.¹⁹

The 2000 census indicated that Hispanics had become the largest minority group in the United States. The Southwest alone accounted for 62 percent of the total Hispanic population, and one of every three residents in these seven states combined was Hispanic (see Figure 2). Arizona, where Hispanics represented 29 percent of its total population, ranked fourth among all states, but its residents of Mexican ancestry far outnumbered every other group. In fact, Mexicans accounted for 83 percent of all Hispanics in the state, while Puerto Ricans placed a distant second at 1.5 percent (see Figures 3/4). The state’s Hispanic population has increased dramatically since 1940, reaching 1.8 million residents in 2006 (see Figure 5). Arizona’s Hispanic population consistently ranks among the fastest growing groups in the United States, and, if current projections hold true, a significant portion of the estimated 128 million Hispanics that will reside in the country in 2050, will call Arizona their home state (see Figure 4b).

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Figure 2.

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The author of the original chapter correctly identified one the major obstacles in the development of Mexican American historiography: the relatively low number of scholars engaged in the field. The last twenty years, however, have witnessed significant growth in the number of Hispanics receiving doctoral degrees, particularly in the areas of education, social sciences, and humanities, the most popular among Hispanics. The number of PhD. recipients has

steadily increased from 572 in 1986 to 1370 in 2006 (of whom 202 graduated from Arizona State and the University of Arizona). Thirty-three Hispanics received doctoral degrees in history in 2006 alone. This figure represents only 4% of all recipients but closely matches the numbers for Asians and African Americans.²⁰ The number of non-Hispanics engaged in the field greatly adds to a promising future. Our knowledge of the history of Mexicans in Arizona has increased considerably since 1987, particularly regarding local histories, the experiences of workers, and political activism. Yet, the historiography of Mexicans in Arizona still has to mature further. The relatively small number of scholars dedicated to this field produces few, if any, arguments of disagreements, which would be a sign of progress and maturity. Furthermore, we need more information on topics that may not appeal to scholars that arrived after the politicization produced by the Chicano movement, such as the growth, success, and isolation of the Mexican American middle class and the inner-group tension between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. We also need more studies that incorporate gender into their approach. Recent work evinces that the infusion of gender complicates the dominant narratives of race, labor, activism, and immigration history. Women, we now know, actively participated in the creation and reformulation of racial ideologies in the mining towns, secured homesteads as heads of household and as wives of non-citizens, migrated to Arizona as daughters and wives but also as single women, and formed associations to protect the education of their children and to resist the destruction of their communities.²¹ These studies illustrate that Hispanics in Arizona have been actors, not just passive victims of historical forces. Based on the progress scholars have made over the past twenty years and on the growing size and significance of the Hispanic population of Arizona, our knowledge of Hispanics in the state will most likely continue to increase consistently.

Notes

¹ “New Statehood Bill,” 57th Congress, 2nd session, document 36, *Senate Documents* v. 5, 1902-1903, 1-10, 14-15, 26, 59-63, 131-135, 163-164, 168-172.

² Appendix to the Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 5-6, 103-104, 182-84.

³ Most notably, Albert Beveridge (R-IN), chairman of the Committee on Territories, whose expansionist visions included the acquisition of Mexico and Central America, stated regarding the Philippines: “We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee of God, of the civilization of the world. . . They [the Filipinos] are a barbarous race, modified by three centuries of contact with a decadent race [the Spanish]. . . It is barely possible that 1,000 men in all the archipelago are capable of self-government in the Anglo-Saxon sense. . . The Declaration [of Independence] applies only to people capable of self-government. “Albert J. Beveridge: In Support of an American Empire,” Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st session, 704-711 <<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ajb72.htm>> (accessed February 23, 2008).

⁴ Linda Carol Noel, “‘The Swinging Door’: U.S. National Identity and the Making of the Mexican Guestworker, 1900-1935,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2006), 2-6, 18-27, 40-44, 49-53, 120-21, 128, 133, 140-41, 196, 199.

⁵ Linda Gordon, *The Great Orphan Abduction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 174-75, 180-181; Thomas E. Sheridan, *Los Tucsonenses: The Mexican Community in Tucson, 1854-1941* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), 35, 89-91, 170-179; Thomas E. Sheridan, *Arizona: A History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995), 151.

⁶ Gordon, *The Great Orphan Abduction*, 3-12, 76-77, 96-97, 102-103, 241-43.

⁷ Katherine Benton, “What About Women in the ‘White Man’s Camp’?: Gender, Class, and the Re-Invention of Race in Cochise County, Arizona, 1853-1940,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2002), 2-11, 497-98, 545-48, 570-72.

⁸ Christine Marin, “Always a Struggle: Mexican Americans in Miami, Arizona, 1909-1951,” (Ph.D. diss., Arizona State University, 2005), 1-2, 11-12, 185-87.

⁹ Bradford Luckingham, *Minorities in Phoenix: A Profile of Mexican American, Chinese American, and African American Communities, 1860-1992* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994), 1-5, 16-19, 25-27, 30-31, 34-36, 40-43, 48-49.

¹⁰ Patricia A. Blaine, “Jose Maria Redondo: Yuma Pioneer and Entrepreneur, 1830-1878,” (Master’s thesis, Arizona State University, 2003), 56-58, 67, 114-16.

¹¹ June Webb-Vignery, “Jacome’s Department Store: Business and Culture in Tucson, Arizona, 1896-1980,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 1985), 10-11, 175-181.

¹² Nancy Lee Prichard, “Paradise Found?: Opportunity for Mexican, Irish, and Italian and Chinese Born Individuals in Jerome Copper Mining District, 1890-1910,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1992), 19-20, 243-47, 264-272.

¹³ Andrea Yvette Huginnie, “‘Strikitos’: Race, Class, and Work in the Arizona Copper Industry, 1870-1920,” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1991), 2-7, 171, 237, 294-95, 339-41.

¹⁴ Eric Vaughn Meeks, “Border Citizens: Race, Labor, and Identity in South-Central Arizona, 1910-1965,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, Austin, 2001), vii-viii, 1-18, 357-63. Linda Carol Noel, “The Swinging Door,” 24-26.

¹⁵ Laura K. Muñoz, “Desert Dreams: Mexican American Education in Arizona, 1870-1930,” (Ph.D. diss., Arizona State University, 2006), 5-7, 76-87, 90-91, 243-45. Herman Robert Lucero, “Plessy to Brown: Education of Mexican Americans in Arizona Public Schools During the Era of Segregation,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2004), 10-17, 113-16.

¹⁶ Lydia R. Otero, “Conflicting Visions: Urban Renewal, Historical Preservation and the Politics of saving a Mexican Past,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2003), 10-21, 261-77. During a more inclusionary period, the Arizona Historical Society renamed the Tucson landmark the Sosa-Carrillo-Fremont House in 1992, adding the names of the families who lived in the home for several generations while keeping the name of the territorial governor who rented it for a few months in 1881.

¹⁷ Pete R. Dimas, “Progress and a Mexican American Community’s Struggle for Existence: Phoenix’s Golden Gate Barrio,” (Ph.D. diss., Arizona State University, 1991), 1-3, 21-25, 239-45.

¹⁸ For examples of resistance see how Mexicans in Miami united with African Americans to resist their displacement from a neighborhood that its owner wanted to develop, in Christine Marin, “Always a Struggle;” how Mexicans in Phoenix successfully challenged the segregation of their children in *Romo v Laird*, in and Laura K. Muñoz, “Desert Dreams;” and how Mexican American women in Tucson created La Plaza de la Mesilla Committee to challenge the destruction of Barrio Libre and to ensure the protection of Mexican landmarks in the future, in Lydia Otero, “Conflicting Visions.” For further information on the importance of the World War II generation, see Bradford Luckingham, *Minorities in Phoenix*.

¹⁹ Darius V. Echeverria, “Aztlán Arizona: Abuses, Awareness, Animosity, and Activism Amid Mexican-Americans, 1968-1978,” (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 2005), ix, 2, 19, 156-58, 168-70, 173-74, 177, 182, 201, 231, 244, 277, 305, 320, 363-66.

²⁰ *Doctoral Recipients from United States Universities: Summary Report 2006*, National Opinion Research Center < [http://www.norc.org/projects/Survey+of+Earned+ Doctorates.htm](http://www.norc.org/projects/Survey+of+Earned+Doctorates.htm) > (accessed February 28, 2008).

²¹ See, for example, Linda Gordon, *The Great Orphan Abduction*; Lydia Otero, “Conflicting Visions;” Carlos Ezequiel Posadas, “Mexican Immigrant Women and their Social Networks in Phoenix Metro, Arizona,” (Ph.D. diss., Arizona State University, 2007); and Katherine Benton-Cohen, “Common Purposes, Worlds Apart: Mexican-American, Mormon, and Midwestern Women Homesteaders in Cochise County, Arizona” *The Western Historical Quarterly* 36:4 (Winter 2005): 429-452.